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The notion of an inductive inference machine aggregating a team of inference 
machines models the problem of making use of several explanations for a single 
phenomenon. This article investigates the amount of information necessary for 
a successful aggregation of the theories given by a team of inference machines. 
Variations of using different kinds of identitication and aggregation are 
investigated. (0 1992 Academic Press, Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article is supplementary to a paper entitled “Aggregating Induc- 
tive Expertise” by Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (1986) where they 
investigate inductive inference of recursively enumerable languages and 
classes of total recursive functions by teams of inference machines which 
are supervised by a chief. 
Here we deal with inference of partial and total recursive functions, with 
questions of preserving special inference strategies of the team machines for 
the chief machine, and with some specific ways of inferring by the chief. 
Not only were the conceptual ideas taken from Osherson et al. (1986), but 
also most of the proofs rely heavily on those given by Osherson et al., 
especially those using a contradiction to Rice’s theorem. 
An inductive inference machine works as follows: from time to time it 
receives instances of a problem (e.g., words of a language, values of a 
function) and outputs hypotheses for a description of the problem (e.g., a 
finite description of the language (grammar), a Giidel number of the 
function). The machine correctly identifies a problem if, given a potentially 
infinite sequence of instances which completely describes the problem, it 
converges to a hypothesis which is a correct description of the problem 
after finitely many steps. This model of “identification in the limit” was first 
introduced by Gold (1967). Fundamental ideas and results are presented 
by Blum and Blum (1975) and by Case and Smith (1983). Angluin and 
Smith (1982) give a survey of theory and methods in the inductive 
inference field. 
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Aggregation of inductive expertise formalizes the following situation: 
consider a number of inference machines, say three, working independently 
on the same sequence of input data, and successively computing hypotheses 
hopefully explaining the input. We call this collection of independent 
machines a team, as Smityh does in (Smith, 1982). But while he defines 
identification by a team as successful identification by at least one team 
machine, here the majority of the team members has to correctly identify 
the input (Osherson et al., 1986). 
A team of inference machines working on the same problem is 
aggregated by a team head if the inference machine constituting the 
aggregator always identifies the problem if the majority of the team 
members do so. The aggregator’s performance for different kinds of infor- 
mation transfer between himself and the team members is investigated. It 
seems that this model is closer to the intuitive concept of team-work than 
the approach in (Smith, 1982), which rather relates to distributed systems. 
Add to this that without a team head the team has to agree about its 
aggregation mechanism. 
In the first section of this paper we present a formal definition of the 
aggregation problem. Some results concerning the aggregation of teams of 
inference machines identifying partial or total recursive functions are given 
in the second section. We then investigate the question of whether special 
strategy types of the team machines can be preserved for the aggregator, 
i.e., whether it is possible to find an aggregator using a special inference 
strategy if all the team members are using a strategy of the same kind. Here 
we extend the preservation methods presented in (Osherson et al., 1986) to 
non-uniform strategies which aggregate special kinds of inference machines 
only. In the fourth section two more general kinds of identification (with 
errors, non-converging sequence of hypotheses) are introduced. For these 
kinds of identification we examine the aggregation problem under 
aggravated conditions. 
For simplicity, all the theorems presented in these sections are proved for 
teams with three members. But with the exception of one theorem they also 
hold for teams with n members, n > 3. Therefore in the fifth section we give 
examples for the generalization of the results to teams with n members. 
I. PRELIMINARIES 
To begin with, we introduce the notation used in the following. Let N be 
the set (0, 1,2, . ..} of natural numbers, and let ( , ): N2 + N be a 
standard pairing function. P” and !R” denote the classes of all partial recur- 
sive resp. total recursive functions of n variables. For n = 1 we also omit the 
upper index, We abbreviate “partial recursive function” by “p.r.f.” (qi)ie N 
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denotes an arbitray Godel numbering of the partial recursive functions. 
(@Jis N denotes a Blum complexity measure (Blum, 1967) associated with 
((PiliEN. By cpi,,(x) we denote the result received after n steps of the com- 
putation of cp on x; i.e., if Gi(x) <n then cpi,,(x) = q,(x), otherwise cpi.,(x) 
is not defined. For cp E P and x E N q(x) 1 means that q(x) is defined, and 
cp(x)t means that q(x) is not defined. dom(cp) and rng(cp) denote the 
domain resp. the range of cp. graph(q) := {(x, I&X)) 1 x E dom(cp)} is called 
the graph of 9. For 9, $ E P we define rp E $ :o graph(q) c graph($). 
DEFINITION 1.1. For cp E P we call @ an enumeration of cp iff @ = 
(a,, aI, . . . . a,,, . . . ) is an infinite sequence with 
(1) (Vie N) a,E(N u {*}), h w ere ai = * means that no element of cp 
is enumerated at step i 
(2) cp(x)=yo(ilieN) ai= (x, y). 
For Us P we call 0 the set of all enumerations of functions in U. For an 
arbitrary but fixed enumeration of 4pi~ P, q,, denotes the subset of 
graph(cp,) established after n steps of the enumeration. 
Let Z := U, (N u (* 1)” be the set of all finite initial sequences of p. 
For (T= (a,,, . . . . a,)EC, i<n, we define a(i) := ai, a[i] := (a,,, . . . . a,), 
lb(a) :=n+ 1, last(a) :=a,, last,(a) :=a,-,, O- := (ao, . . . . a,_,), and 
x~rgn(o) iff XE N and 3 i<n such that x =aj. 0 EZ is the sequence of 
length zero. 
DEFINITION 1.2. Suppose U c P, and M: C + N is a partial recursive 
function. UE P is called identifiable by M iff V$ E 0 the following hold: 
(1) (VnEN ) ~bX~l)L 
(2) i := lim, M(@[n]) exists and is called the limit hypothesis, 
t3) cPgcPi. 
U(M) is the maximal set identifiable by A4, 
EX(M) := { U E P 1 U is identifable by M}, 
EX := { U c P 1 U is identifiable by some M}. 
The term “EX” (explainable) has been introduced by Case and Smith 
(1978). 
The p.r.f. M: C+ IV is called an (inductive) inference machine, 
abbreviated by IIM. In the following we will use the notation M[a] to 
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denote the sequence of outputs of the inference machine A4 on the input 
Q E C if M(a) is defined, i.e., 
M[o] := (WdOI 1, ..., WdWu)- 11)) if (Vi<lh(a))M(o[i])J, 
t otherwise. 
Furthermore, we get an enumeration I of all inference machines by a 
Godel numbering cp using a bijective recursive enumeration c: C -+ N, 
namely 
Now we extend the definition of “identification by an inference machine” 
to “identification by a team of inference machines,” where a team consists 
of three inference machines M;, M,, and M,, denoted by (i, j, k) E fV3. 
DEFINITION 1.3. Let (i, j, k) E N3, @E p, and U c P’. (i, j, k) identifies 4 
iff 
(4 (VnE NJ Mi($Cnl)l, Mj(GCnl)l, MdGCnl)l and 
(b) at ieast two of the machines Ml, M,, Mk identify $. 
(i, j, k) identifies cp iff (i, j, k) identities each @ E { cp }. (i, j, k) identifies U iff 
(i, j, k) ident f iies each cp~U. U(i, j,k):={cpEPl(i, j,k) identifies cp}, 
EX(i, j, k) := { UZ P 1 (i, j, k) identifies U}, and T-EX := { U c P 13 (i, j, k) E 
N3 with (i, j, k) identifies U}. 
A team of inference machines ihentifies a partial recursive function cp if 
the majority of the team members identifies cp, but we do not know which 
of the machines work successfully. So in order to make use of the 
hypotheses given by the team members we need a supervising inference 
machine, defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 1.4. Let (i, j, k) E N3, U E P, and M and IIM. M aggregates 
(i, j, k) on U iff, VP E U, 
(i, j, k) identifies cp * M identities cp. 
M then is called the aggregator of (i, j, k) on U. 
In order to come up with a hypothesis M(o) the aggregator M needs 
information about the team machines’ work. We distinguish four kinds of 
information, called “recent,” “pure,” “hypothesis,” and “program.” If the 
aggregator has to get along with “recent” information he will at step n 
see the most recent hypothesis given by each team member. In the case 
of “pure” information he will see all the hypotheses given by the team 
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members up to step n. Information of the kind “hypothesis” contains all 
the hypotheses of the team members as well as the input sequence rr given 
so far. If the aggregator gets “program” information he knows the input CT 
and the programs of the team members themselves. The four kinds of 
information are formally defined as follows: 
DEFINITION. 
INF recent : = ((“i(a), Mj(0), Mk(a)) I  ti, j5 k, E  N39 o E  c}. 
INFpure ~={(“~[~1~Mj[al~M~[al)I(i~~~k)E~3~~EC}~ 
INF hypothesis :=((“iCal,MjCal,M,[al,a)l(i,~,k)E~33,~E~). 
INF program:={(i,j,kr~)I(i,j,k)E~3,~EC}. 
In the following INF,(i, j, k, a) denotes the respective information for 
one quadruple (i, j, k, C) and A E (recent, pure, hypothesis, program}. 
Using a function 19 which hands over the information to the aggregator, we 
can now make Definition 1.4 more precise: 
DEFINITION 1.6. Let A E {recent, pure, hypothesis, program}, UG P, 
and 8: INF, + N such that Aa.B(INF,(i, j, k, a)) is a partial recursive 
function, i.e., the machine M from Definition 1.4. 
Then [e, A, U] := {(i,j, k)e N311~.QINFA(i,j, k, a)) aggregates (i,j, k) 
on U}, and [A, U] := { Ts. N3 I(3 p.r.f. 0: INF, -+ f+J) TE [O, A, U] >. 
As an aggregator can simulate another aggregator getting less informa- 
tion, for all Us P obviously [recent, U] c [pure, U] E [hypothesis, U] E 
[program, U]. From Definition 1.6 it directly follows that for a kind of 
information A and UC U’ G P, [A, U] E [A, U’]. 
II. AGGREGATION ON P AND ON [w 
In this section we investigate whether there are inference machines which 
are able to aggregate all teams on R resp. P, and how much information 
about the team members such aggregators need. 
In order to design the aggregating machines we make use of an injective 
recursive function v E R2 defined as follows: 
Let a, by M 
cpll(x) if cp,(x) 1 and @&I < @b(x), 
(P”(a.b)(x) := (P&J if (P&I 1 and @dx) G @,(x), 
T else. 
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For cp, I++ E P’ we say that cp contradicts $ iff there is an x E dom(cp) n 
dom(ll/) with q(x) # Ii/(x). For a, b, n E N we say that (P~,~ contradicts (P~,~ 
ifftherearex,,,zcN withJl#z, (-u,y)~(~,,,,and(x,z)~(~~,~. 
LEMMA 2.1. Let cp, cpu, (POE P. If cp,, (Pi do not contradict cp, then 
dom(cp) c dom(cp,) u dom(cp,) implies cp G (P~(~,~,. 
The following theorem says that there is an inference machine M which 
is able to aggregate each team on P’ if M gets information of the kind 
“hypothesis” about the work of the team members. Osherson et al. (1986) 
already have shown the corresponding result for aggregation on R: 
N3 E [hypothesis, R]. 
THEOREM 2.2. N3 E [hypothesis, p]. 
Proof: We present a stepwise defined strategy 0: C* + N. Using this 
strategy, an inference machine M can aggregate each team (i, j, k) E N on 
P. 6 tries to find two converging team members which do not contradict 
the input function cp E P, i.e., whose limit hypotheses denote functions not 
contradicting cp. In going from R to P, the problem is that such a team 
member actually might converge to a hypothesis which denotes a subfunc- 
tion of the input function, But as one of these team members must identify 
cp, the function v E R* of Lemma 2.1 helps to find a correct hypothesis. 
At step n, let g := @[n], go := Mi[o], G, := M,[a], [r2 := Mk[o]. 
Step 1. B(o,, cr,, ITS, a) := v(last(a,), last(a,)). Goto step 2. 
Step n> 1. 
Case 1. One team member contradicts the input sequence o; i.e., 
there are x, y, ZEN, y#z, (x,~)~rng(o), and for some I~{i,j,k}, 
(x3 zi E VM,(o,,n. Then @a,, cl, cr2, a) := u(M,(a), M,(a)), for p #q # 
l#p, P, qE {i,j, k). 
Case 2. Not case 1. 
(a) One team member changes its hypothesis in this step; i.e., for 
some1E {i,j, k},M,(o)#M,(o-).Thene((r,, (ri, ez, a) :=u(M,(o),M,(o)) 
forp#q#I#p, q,PE(i,j,k}. 
(b) Not case (a); i.e., tlf~ {i,j, k), M,(a)=M,(o-). Then 
8th 6 5 u):=qu&,u, ,u;,u ). 
Goto step n + 1. 
We show that 8 does the job. Let (i, j, k)E N3, and let $E @i, j, k). 
Consider the following cases: 
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(A) All the three team machines converge. Then after some step no 
case Z(a) cannot occur any more. If thereafter case 1 arises, then henceforth 
it must occur always, and M, and M, must identify $, because M, 
obviously does not. If case 1 does not arise, then all the team machines 
converge to functions that do not contradict the input function. At most 
one of them may be a subfunction of 40. Therefore 8 also identifies (p’ 
according to Lemma 2.1. 
(B) One team machine M, diverges. Then the other two machines 
Mp and M, must correctly identify 3, and after some step no in either of 
the cases 1 or 2(a) u(M,, M,) will be a correct index for q. 1 
Theorem 2.2 also follows from a result presented by Pitt and Smith 
(1988). They have studied the relation between teams of inference machines 
and probabilistic inference machines, i.e., inference machines which identify 
a problem with a given probability. Pitt and Smith show that in general 
each team of inference machines can be aggregated by a single machine iff 
identification by a team of inference machines is defined as identification by 
a majority of the team members, in contrast to other definitions where only 
some team members have to identify the input. 
COROLLARY 2.3. EX = T-EX. 
Proof EX c T-EX because U E EX by U E U(M,) can be identified by 
the team (i, i, i). T-EXE EX follows from Theorem 2.2. 1 
Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (1986) have shown that for UE IF! 
already aggregation of the type “pure” suffices to supervise all teams 
(i, j, k) E N3; i.e., N3 E [pure, IR]. This results from the fact that for cp E R 
two machines can output contradicting hypotheses only if one of them 
already contradicts the input function cp. However, for rp E P two 
hypotheses may contradict outside the domain of cp: 
THEOREM 2.4 (Schafer-Richter, 1986). N3$ [pure, [Fp]. 
Proof Let 8: C3 + N be the strategy of a given inference machine M. 
We have to show that there is a team (i, j, k)~ N which M cannot 
aggregate on P if in every step M does not know more than the hypotheses 
so far computed by the team members. 
If 8 is not a total function there is nothing to prove, since any strictly 
partial function 8 cannot aggregate a team (i, j, k) meeting one of B’s 
domain gaps with some initial sequence of hypotheses and then converging, 
therefore identifying at least one function. So in the following we can 
assume that 0 is a total recursive function. 
We define functions cp,, (Pi E P and a team (i, j, k) by diagonalisation 
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over the actions of 8. The team identifies either cp= or qb, whereas 8 
aggregating over this team can identify neither rp, or qh. 
q,(x) := 0 for all x E N 
vPb(x) := 
i 
1 if x=0 
0 else 
(Vo E Z) Mi(0) := a and M,(a) := b. 
In the following definition of Mk, ui denotes a string of i consecutive ds. 
Step 1. Va EC with lb(a) = 1 let Mk(g) := a, h(1) := @a, b, a). Goto 
step 2. 
Step n> 1. Let aEC of length n, h(n- 1) :=O(u”-‘, b”-l, Mk[cp]). 
Case 1: (Pi+ i,,(O) converges. If (P&-i,,,(O) # 0, then M,(a) := a, if 
qh+ l,,,(O) = 0, then Mk(c) := b. 
Case 2. Not case 1, then M,(a) :=M,(a-). Goto step n+ 1. 
Now, on each input $5, M, converges to a, and Mj converges to 6. We 
assume that Ao.B(Mi[o], Mj[o], Mk[c]) converges to a hypothesis h; i.e., 
there is an m E N such that (tm am) h(n) = h(m). Otherwise A4 does not 
identify any function but the team always identifies the function which 
everywhere is zero, but on argument 0 is undefined. 
If case 1 occurs infinitely often, then it will always occur after some step 
n,. Therefore either Mk converges to u and the team identifies qa, or A4 
converges to b and the team identifies qb. But cp, g (Ph in the first case, 
and qb g qh in the second case. If case 2 occurs infinitely often, then M, 
converges either to a or to b, but qh diverges on argument 0. Therefore the 
inference machine A4 identifies neither q0 nor (Pi. 1 
Furthermore, Osherson et al. (1986) show that IV3 # [recent, R], from 
which it follows that [recent, R] c [pure, R]. We now present the 
analogous result for aggregation on P, using their proof idea. 
THEOREM 2.5. [recent, P’] c [pure, P]. 
Proof. In (Osherson et al., 1986) it is shown that the set S, u S2 u S, r$ 
[recent, W], with 
s, = {(e, e, f(n))ln~ N}, 
&= ~(e~f(n)~f(n))ln~~)7 and 
S3 = ((5 g(n), f(n)) In E ~4 1, 
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where (VGEC) M,(a) = a for an arbitrary (P,E R. Moreover, for the 
functions f, g, h E R it holds that for all n E N 
l vhcn) E  K  and phcn) = cp iff cp,Gcp,, 
l w  6 a Mj-(,)(fJ) = h(n), and 
if lh( g) is even, 
else. 
From the result in (Osherson et al., 1986) it follows that S, u S2 u 
S, $ [recent, P]. 
Now, let 0: C3 -+ N E P be defined by 
0 if (3~ (0, 1,2}) lh(o,) < 1, 
8(a,, c,, a*) := 
1 
last(a,) if last(o,) = last,(a,), 
last(o,) else. 
We show that B aggregates each team (i, j, k) E S, u S, u S3 on P. For each 
index n E N one of the following cases arises: 
(1) cpn~cpm so (Ph(n)=(Pa. Therefore each (i, j, k) E S1 u S2 u S, 
identifies (P,,, and so does lo.B(Mi[g], M,[o], MJa]). 
(2) 4~~ g (P~ and (P,, s (Pi, then (e, f(n), f(n)) identifies q,,, and so 
does ~~.Wf,[~l, Mfc,,Col). But (e, e, f(n)) and (e, g(n), S(n)) do not 
identify q,, . 
(3) (Pn Y= (Pa and (Pn g (Ph(n), then none of the teams in S, u S, u S, 
identifies q,, . 
It follows that S, u S2 u S3 E [pure, On]. 1 
The result presented in this section together with the results already 
given in (Osherson et al., 1986) are as follows: 
[recent, R] c [pure, R] = [hypothesis, W] = [program, IR] = 2N3, 
U II 
[recent, P] c [pure, P] c [hypothesis, P] = [program, P] = 2”‘. 
Where 2”’ denotes the set of all subsets of N3. 
III. AGGREGATION PRESERVING STRATEGY TYPES 
A great variety of strategy types are defined in the literature on inductive 
inference, all of which restrict the kind of algorithms an inference machine 
can use in a certain way. We present a list of strategy types and investigate 
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the question of whether the strategy type of the team members can be 
extended to the aggregator. 
DEFINITION 3.1. Let Bs I be a strategy type, i.e., a class of inference 
machines whose algorithm is restricted in a certain way. Then lVi := 
{(~,~,~)E~J~I{M~,M,,M,)GB} is th e set of all teams such that all team 
members are of strategy type B. 
For example, an inference machine of strategy type “weak’ always 
converges, whereas a “strong” inference machine diverges it cannot identify 
the input function. 
Obviously for all strategy types B c Z, 
Ni c N3 E [pure, R] = [hypothesis, P]. 
1. Non-uniform Methods 
In this section we are interested in the following question: 
Given a strategy type B, for which kinds of information A 
is it possible to find an inference machine aggregating all 
teams in Ni and itself using a strategy of type B? 
We will answer this question for weak, strong, and consistent strategies. 
DEFINITION 3.2. Let A E (recent, pure, hypothesis, program}, 8: 
INF, + N a partial recursive function, and B s I a strategy type. Then 0 
A-preserves B iff V(i, j, k) E FV i it holds that 10. B(INF,(i, j, k, (T)) E B. 
In some of the following proofs we will use a function dE lR3, defined by 
graPh(cpai,j.,,) := kraph(cpi) ngraph(cpi)) u kwwh(cp,) n wph(cp,)) 
u kraPh(cpi) n (graphh)) 
for all i, j, k E N. This function has a useful property: 
LEMMA 3.3. If cp E P and at least two of the functions (pi, ‘pi, qk E P are 
extensions of cp, then qdCi.j,k, is an extension of cp as well. 
At first, we will examine the weak inference machines which were 
introduced by Brandt (1982). 
DEFINITION 3.4. An inference machine M is called weak iff 
(V$ E p) M(@) 1, i.e., M always converges but may converge to a wrong 
hypothesis. 
IW:= (MEZJM is weak}. 
PROPOSITION 3.5. There exists 8: N3 + N p.r.J with bJ:, c 
[O, recent, P], and 8 recent-preserves IW. 
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ProoJ: Let &a, b, c) := d(a, b, c). 
For (i, j, k) E N :w and n, a step after which the three machines never 
change their hypotheses, M= Ja.6(Mi(a), Mj(a), M,(a)) will never 
change its hypothesis after step n,, either. Therefore M is weak. 
Let @E o(i, j, k), then at least two of the limit hypotheses Q, b, c E N are 
indices for extensions of cp, and according to Lemma 3.3. (P~(~,~,~, extends q, 
too. Therefore M identifies $5. 1 
DEFINITION 3.6. An inference machine M is called strong iff 
(V@ E p) M(G) 1 + cp G ‘pwCCj, i.e., if M does not identify 6 then it diverges. 
ZST := (ME I{ M is strong}. 
Strong inference machines (also called “reliable”) have been introduced 
by Minicozzi (1976). 
PROPOSITION 3.7. There exists 8: C3 + N p.r.f with N&. E [fl, pure, FJ], 
and 8 pure-preserves ZST. 
Proof: We give a stepwise definition of an appropriate strategy. 
8 tries to find a converging team machine and then outputs its 
hypothesis. At each step, (TV denotes the sequence of hypotheses so far given 
by the ith team member, iE (0, 1,2}. By k(a,, gi, CJ*)E (0, 1,2} we will 
mark the team member which is assumed to converge. k(a; , a;, a;) is 
abbreviated by k-. 
Step n. If 3i 6 2 with lh(rr,) 6 1 
then Qo,, cr,, CJ~) := 0, 
k(a,, c,, CJJ := 0 
else if last(cr,-) #last,(a,-) 
then k(o,, c,, 02) := (k- + 1) mod 3 
8(0,, 01, 02) := qo, ) a; ) 0;) + 1 
else k(a,, crl, az) := k-, 
B(o,, 6i, c2) := last(a,-). 
Go to step n + 1. 
Now let (i, j, k) E N &. and @ E p. 
If two of the team machines converge, then M = &J. f7(Mi(a), Mj(a), 
M,(a)) converges to the same index h as one of them. But h must be a 
correct index for cp, because all the team members are strong. Therefore M 
identifies cp. 
If M converges its limit hypothesis is equal to the limit hypothesis of a 
team member ZE IV,~,. Therefore M is strong. 1 
On the other hand information of the kind “recent pure” does not suffice 
to aggregate teams in N&, on P, moreover not even on R. We prove this 
using a method of Osherson et al. (1986). 
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THEOREM 3.8. Nj,, $ [recent, R]. 
Proof: Let (pLI E Iw and M, be an inference machine defined as follows: 
M,(o) := a if g E (Pi or lb(a) is even, 
lb(a) else. 
We define three functions f, g, h E [w such that, for all n E N, 
(Ph(n) E Iw> (Ph(n) = qcz * (Pn 2 vu, and h(n) #a; 
Mf(“,(O) := 
h(n) if v G (Ph(n) or lb(a) even, 
Ma) else, 
M&,(4 := a 
if lh( c) is even, 
h(n) else. 
It holds that Vn E N M,, Mfc,,, MgcnJ E IST. 
Suppose there exists a p.r.f. 6: N3 + N with N &, E [0, recent, IR]. Then 
we can deduce a contradiction to Rice’s theorem (Rice, 1953): 
Choose n E N. 
If cp”~cp,Y then (e, g(n), f(n)) identifies cp, E IR. Now, for M= 
~c4KWy %+)(4, ~f(n,(4) and 0 E 2 
@a, a, h(n)) 
M(a)= &a, h(n), h(n)) i 
if lh( a) is even, 
else. 
Therefore it must hold that O(a, a, h(n)) = &a, h(n), h(n)), otherwise M 
would never converge and therefore not aggregate (e, g(n), f(n)) on [w, 
contradicting the supposition. 
If (Pn P (Pa, then (Ph(n,f (Pa. On input @, the team (e, e, f(n)) which 
identifies qo, will output (a, a, h(n)) at each second step. Therefore 
q@,&(n)) = (Pi must hold with regard to the supposition. Analogously, on 
input @&) the team (e,f(n),f(n)) which identifies qhcnj will output 
(a, h(n), h(n)) at each second step, and consequently ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ = qhcnj 
It follows that @a, h(n), h(n)) # O(a, a, h(n)). 
Therefore we could decide “cpn E cp O?” by comparing 0(a, a, h(n)) and 
@a, h(n), h(n)), contradicting the Rice’s theorem. 1 
We now want to examine consistent inference machines which have been 
defined by Wiehagen (1976). 
DEFINITION 3.9. An inference machine A4 is consistent iff V+ E P and 
Vn E N, if M(@(n)) 1 then Vx, y E N( (x, y ) E rng($[n]) * v~(@[“]‘(x) = y), 
i.e., each hypothesis denotes a function which is an extension of the input. 
ICONS := {ME I] M consistent }. 
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PROPOSITION 3.10. There exists a p.r.f: 8: C3 + N with N:CoNS c 
[tl, pure, p] and 8 pure-preserve ICONS. 
ProoJ The proof is a slight modification of the one given for Proposi- 
tion 3.7. We replace step n of the definition of 0: ,X3 -+ N by 
Step n. If 3 6 2 with lh(a,) < 1 
then k(a,, IJ~, a*) := 0; 
if cD = 0 then &a,, rri, g2) := 0, 
else 6(0,, cri, rrz) := last(a,), 
else if last(a,-) #last,(o,-) 
then k(a,, or, crz) := (k- + 1) mod 3; 
f3(0,, (ri, frz) := last(a,), 
else k(a,, c,, az) := k-; 
8(a0, ol, fr2) := last(o,-). 
Now M= io.tl(M,[o], M, [a], M,Jo]) converges if only one of the team 
members converges, and this limit hypothesis has to be correct for the 
reason of consistency of the team members. A4 is consistent as well, because 
it always outputs the same index as one of the team machines. 1 
The following diagram once again shows whether it is possible to find an 
A-preserving strategy of type B for the aggregation on C, CE {P, rW>: 
Weak Strong Consistent 
Recent 
Pure 
Hypothesis 
Program 
2. Uniform Methods 
on P not on IR 
on P on P on [Fp 
on P on P on P 
on P on P on P 
The strategy type preserving inference methods presented in Section III.1 
aggregate a team of inference machines only if all the team members are of 
the strategy type which shall be preserved. They are not necessarily 
uniform in the sense that they aggregate all sets of teams, and in addition 
preserve a certain strategy type. We now investigate the question whether 
we can extend the above-mentioned results to such uniform methods. 
DEFINITION 3.11. Let BE Z a strategy type, UG P, A E {recent, pure, 
hypothesis, program}. We say that [A, U] preserves B iff the following 
holds: 
[A, U] = { Tc N3 13 p.r.f. 8 with Tc [e, A, U], and 8 A-preserves B}. 
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PROPOSITION 3.12. [hypothesis, p] preserves the weak strategies. 
Proof We have to show that for each TE [hypothesis, P] there exists 
a p.r.f. 8 for a machine M which aggregates each team in Ton P and which 
is weak if all team machines are weak. It suffices to show this for 
N3 E [hypothesis, 5’1. Inspection of the proof of Theorem 2.2 shows that 
the machine defined there already does all we need, if we ensure that 
in case 1 always the smallest witness for a contradiction is used for the 
computation of the aggregator’s hypothesis. 1 
THEOREM 3.13. [pure, R] preserves the weak strategies. 
Proof: We modify the proof by Osherson et al. (1986) for 
N3 E [pure, R]. Let (i, j, k) E N3. For the definition of 0: ,X3 --+ N we use 
two markers a(aO, (or, a,), /?(o,, or, cr?)~ (0, 1,2} varying over the teams, 
and at each step marking those teams which are supposed to be the 
identifying ones. Moreover, for oO, or, rr2 EZ it is n :=lh(a,) +lh(a,) + 
lh(a,), CI- :=c(((T&, a;, a;), BP :=fl(o;, a;, a;), a :=last(a,-), and 
b := last(crg-). 
Case 1. (3iG2) lh(a,)< 1 then 8(rr,, or, az) :=O, ~(a,, (or, az) :=O, 
P(a,, Cl, 02) := 1. 
Case 2. Not case 1, and either 
(a) last (cr,-) # last,(a,-) or last(opm) #last,(oa-), or 
(b) (~a.” contradicts (P,,~ then 
a’ := (a- + 1) mod 3; fl’ := (p- + 1) mod 3; 
a ” := (a- + 2) mod 3; /I” := (fl- + 2) mod 3; 
a’ := last(a,,); b’ := last(oPS); 
a ” := last(a,..); b” := last(clBV,); 
if voz,” does not contradict (P~‘,~ 
then cl(gO, rr,, 02) := CI’, 
P(a,, ~1,~*) := B’, 
else if qaVS,n does not contradict (P~,,,~ 
then a(~,,, o,, az) := a”, 
B(a,, 01, o*) := B”, 
else a(~,, (or, fr2) := C 
P(a,, Cl, az) :=P-‘; 
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Case 3. Neither case 1 nor case 2. Then 
a := Wcc,,,,,.,,,h 
b := W~B,~0,0,.g2J~ 
tqa,, (Tl,OJ := v(u, b). 
Again it holds that N3 = [0, pure, R]. 
We have to show that M= ~JYJ.~?(M~[u], M.,[o], Mk[o]) is weak if all 
the team machines are. Let @E P, (i j, k) E rW:,, and a, b, c be the limit 
hypotheses of the team members. Consider the following cases: 
(a) None of the functions cp,, (Pi, (pc contradicts another one. Then 
case (2) does not occur after the convergence of all the team members. 
Therefore M converges. 
(b) Exactly two of the functions (po, v~, cp,, say (Pi and (Pi, do not 
contradict each other. Then after the convergence of the team members the 
markers remain standing on those team members which converge to a and 
b, respectively. Therefore M converges. 
(c) The functions cpU, (Pi, cpr are pairwise contradictory. Then after 
the convergence of the team members witnesses for all these contradictions 
are eventually detected, so the markers do not move any longer. Therefore 
M converges. 
It follows that A4 is weak. 1 
PROPOSITION 3.14. [hypothesis, P] preserves the strong strategies. 
Proof We use the construction of 0 given in Theorem 2.2 with a little 
extension which ensures that the aggregator does not converge by mistake 
to an index which is not an extension of the input function. 
A new case 2(a) is introduced and the old cases 2(a) and 2(b) are shifted 
to 2(b) and 2(c). 
Case 2(a). (3O<i<j<2) such that last(a,)#last,(a,), and 
last(a,) # last,( a,). 
Again N 3 = [0, hypothesis, P]. 
V(i,j, k)~ fV3 the aggregator M=;l~.0(M,[a], M,[o], Mk[a], 0) 
converges on input @ only if the sequence of hypotheses of at least two 
team machines converge on $. So if M,, M,, Mk are strong then M either 
converges to a correct hypothesis, or it diverges. Therefore 13 hypothesis- 
preserves IST. [ 
Furthermore, Osherson et al. (1986) have shown that (pure, R] preserves 
the strong strategies. 
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PROPOSITION 3.15. [hypothesis, P] preserves the consistent strategies. 
Proof: Again the construction of Theorem 2.2 already preserves 
consistency. For let (i, j, k) E N &,,. @ E P, n E N. If the last three 
hypotheses at step n on input $[n] are a, b, c then $[n] E cp,, qPb and cpc. 
So according to Lemma 2.1 @[n] G ~p,~,,~,, (P~(~,~,, and (P”(~.~). It follows 
that la.O(Mi[o], M,[o], Mk[e], ~)EZCONS. 
Theorem 2.2 also showed that N3 = [e, hypothesis, P]. 1 
PROPOSITION 3.16. [pure, IL!] preserves the consistent strategies. 
Prooj This result directly follows from the proof by Osherson et al. 
(1986) showing “N3 E [pure, R].” [ 
We now show that preservation is not possible for arbitrary strategy 
types. For this purpose we introduce the finite strategies which have been 
defined by Freivald and Wiehagen (1979). 
DEFINITION 3.17. M is called finite iff V@ E p and Vi, k E fW M(@[i] ) = 
M($[i+l])=>M(@[i])=M($[i+k]). 
ZFZN := {ME I) M is finite}. 
PROPOSITION 3.18. N&,, E [pure, p]. 
Proof: Let 13: z3 + N be defined by: 
Case 1. (Vi< 2) last(a,) = last,(o,). 
Then 8((r,, cl, (TV) := d(last(aO), last(cr,), last(a,)). 
Case 2. Not case 1, and (30 < i<j< 2) last(ai) = last,(oi) and 
last(aj) = last,(a,). 
Then B(a,, ol, (T*) := v(last(ai), last(a,)). 
Case 3. Neither case 1 nor case 2. 
Then 8(0,, g,, g2) :=O. 
Let (i, j, k) E N &,, and $ E o( i, j, k). 
If all three team members converge on input @ then after some 
step no W4i[@Cnll, Mj[@Cnll, MJ@Cnll) conwses to Wfi(~Cnol), 
M,($[n,]), Mk($[no])), and because (i, j, k) identifies @ this is a correct 
hypothesis. If one team member diverges on input @, then after some step 
no 0 sticks on v(a, 6) where a, b are the hypotheses of the identifying team 
machines. Consequently v(a, 6) is a correct limit hypothesis. 
It follows that na.e(Mi[o], M,[a], MJo]) aggregates (i,j, k) on P. 1 
PROPOSITION 3.19. N &,N # [recent, R]. 
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Proof: Consider the set S := S1 v S,u S3 defined in the proof of 
Theorem 2.5. As already mentioned, Osherson et al. proved that 
S# [recent, pure, R]. But Ss fV&. 1 
It is not possible to find an inference machine which aggregates all the 
teams on (ID and which also preserves the finite strategies, not even if 
information of type “program” is used. 
THEOREM 3.20. There is no p.r.f: 0: N3 x ,Y -+ N with N:,, c 
[e, program, P] and 8 program-preserves IFIN. 
Prooj The class U c P delined below can be identified by a team 
G,.LW%N~ but not by a single finitely identifying IIM: 
U:=U1wU2v((p,}, where 
0 
cp&) := t 
i 
if n even, 
else, 
U,:=(cp~PI(Vn~fV)(p(2n)=Oand(3!n~f+J,nodd)cp(n)=l}, 
U,:=(q~P~(Vn~RJ)q(2n)=Oand(3!n~N,nodd)q(n)=2). 
If 
if n even, 
else 
and 
if n even, 
else, 
then the following team will finitely identify U: 
Mi(o) := a VOEC, 
M,(a) := b V’aE‘r, 
a if for some n E N (n, 1) E rng(a), 
M,Jo) := b if for some n E N (n, 2 ) E rng(o), 
lb(a) else. 
Now suppose there exists M finitely identifying U, i.e., for input @, there 
is a smallest m such that 
M(@,[m]) = M(@‘,[m + k]) = i 
Then there is a function q,p, with 
for k E N, and 40, E ‘pi. 
graph(cpJu {(L’W if cPiCIJE (0, 1, t 1, 
graph(cp,) u (( ,l ) > else. 
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The following enumeration of cp,, cannot be identified by A4 though (pb. E U: 
1 
(2n, 0) if n<m+l, 
@,dn) := (1, ~~~41)) if n =m + 2, 
(2(n- I), 0) if n>m+2 
and lim, M(@,,[n]) = M(@,,[nz]) = M(@,[m])= i, but rp, g vi. i 
The following diagram summarizes the results concerning uniform [A, C] 
preservation of strategies of type B, CE {P, R}: 
d” Weak Strong Consistent Finite 
Cpure, RI + + + 
[hypothesis, P] + + + 
Cpwram, P 1 + + + - 
A “ + ” “says [A, C] preserves the strategies of type B,” while a “ - ” says 
“[A, C] does not preserve the strategies of type B.” 
IV. AGGREGATION FOR BC- AND EX*-IDENTIFICATION 
Now two more general identification criteria are considered. 
BC-identification (“behaviorally correct”) (Case and Smith, 1983) renoun- 
ces convergence of the sequence of hypotheses given by an inference 
machine, whereas EX*-identification (Blum and Blum, 1975) allows finitely 
many discrepancies between the input function and the function denoted 
by the limit hypotheses of the inference machine. For these weakened 
identification criteria we examine two special kinds of aggregation, called 
direct and efficient aggregation, respectively. For EX-identifcation these 
kinds of aggregation have already been investigated by Osherson et al. 
DEFINITION 4.1. Us P is BC-identijiable by ME I iff (V@ E 0) 
(i) (Vn E f+J) M(@[n]) 1 and 
(ii) (%c N)(Vn 2 4 cp E ~~~~~~~~ 
BC(M) := ( U G P 1 U is BC-identifiable by M}, BC := { U G P ) (3 inference 
machine M) U is BC-identifiable by M}. 
DEFINITION 4.2. Let (i, j, k) E iYJ3. The team (i, j, k) BC-identifies U iff 
(V@ E 0) 
(i) WnENO Mi(GCnl)l, Mj(GCnl)l, and Mk(@Cnl)l, and 
(ii) at least two of the machines Mi, Mj, and M, BC-identify @. 
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An inference machine M BC-aggregates (i, j, k) on U iff (Vcp E U) (i j, k) 
BC-identifies q => M BC-identifies q. Then M is called the BC-aggregator 
of (i, j, k) on U. 
DEFINITION 4.3. Let A E (recent, pure, hypothesis, program}, 8: 
INF,d + N a p.r.f. and U c p, 
[9, A, U,BC] := ((i,j,k)~~‘11Za.B(INF,(i,j,k,a)) 
BC-aggregates (i, j, k) on U}, 
[A, U, BC] := {Tc N3) (3 p.r.f. 8: INF, + fU) Tc [O, A, U, BC]}. 
As already mentioned, Pitt and Smith (1988) proved that each team of 
inference machines can be aggregated by a single inference machine if the 
majority of the team members have to identify the input for the team to be 
successful. While Pitt and Smith assume that the aggregating machine gets 
information of the kind “hypothesis” about the work of the team, we show 
that information of the kind “recent” is sufficient for the definition of a 
strategy 0 such that all teams can be BC-aggregated on P. 
PROPOSITION 4.4. N 3 E [recent, P, BC]. 
Proof. Let @(a, b, c) :=for all a, b, CE N, where do R3 is the function 
defined at the beginning of Section 111.1. 
If (i, j, k) BC-identifies @E p then two of the team constituents, say Mj 
and Mj, BC-identify @. That is, there exists n, such that, Vn > n,, 
q c ‘PWeTnl) and cp E (PM,($[nl). 
It follows that 
q s ‘Pd(M~(U5Cnl).M,(~Cnl).~~(~c~l)). 
Therefore N3 = [IO, recent, P, BC]. 1 
We now consider special kinds of aggregation already introduced by 
Osherson et al. (1986). 
DEFINITION 4.5. ME I Be-aggregates (i, j, k) E N 3 directly on V iff M 
BC-aggregates (i, i, k) on U and (V@ E 0) (Vn E FU) M(r$[n]) E { Mi(@[n], 
Mj(@Cnlh M/c(cp’Cnl)I. 
We define the point of identification ZP(M, @) as the smallest m E IV such 
that for all man ~~~~~~~~~~~ if M BC-identities & else IP(M, @) is 
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undefined. This definition is naturally extended to the point of identilica- 
tion of a team (i, j, k) on @: if the team identifies @ then ZP(i, j, k, @) is the 
smallest m E N such that at least two of the team members have reached 
their point of convergence in step m, otherwise it is undefined. 
DEFINITION 4.6. A4 K-aggregates (i, j, k) efficiently on U iff M 
BC-aggregates (i, j, k) on U and (V@ E 0 with (i, j, k) BC-identifies $) 
ZP(M, @) d ZP(i, j, k, d,. 
Osherson et al. (1986) have shown that for EX-identification direct and 
efficient aggregation restricts the power of the aggregator, namely 
l N 3 # [program, direct, R], and 
l N3 $ [program, efficient, R]. 
In case of BC-identification we can show: 
PROPOSITION 4.7. N 3 E [recelzt, efficient, P, BC]. 
Proof. The p.r.f. 0 defined in the proof of Proposition 4.4 already works 
efficiently. 1 
However, even for BC-identification direct aggregation is more restric- 
tive. 
PROPOSITION 4.8. N3 # [pure, direct, P, BC]. 
Proof Take 
cp,(n) := 
{ 
0 for n =O, 1 
t else, 
cpbb) := 
i 
0 for n=l,2 
t else, 
cp,(n) := 1 0 for n =O, 2 t else, 
and M,(o)=a, Mj(o)= b, M,(o)=c for all ~EC. 
The team (i, j, k) then identifies the set {cpO, cp,, cpz} with graph(cpi) = 
(((0)) for iE{O, 1,2}. 
But no directly aggregating aggregator can identify more than two of the 
functions cpO, cp,, and (p2 using only information of the kind “pure,” 
because, if he infinitely often outputs “a,” then he cannot identify qr, 
etc. 1 
ON AGGREGATING INDUCTIVE EXPERTISE 159 
We now turn to EX*-identification, which allows finitely many “errors” 
in the function denoted by the limit hypotheses of an inference machine. 
DEFINITION 4.9. Us P is EX*-identifiable by ME I iff (V$ E ii) 
(i) (VneN) W$Cnl)l, 
(ii) lim, M($[n]) := i exists, and 
(iii) cp c * ‘pi, i.e., card( (x E dom(cp) 1 q(x) # q,(x)}) < co. 
EX* := { Ur P 1 U is EX*-identifiable}. 
In the obvious way then also (i, j, k) EX*-identifies U, M EX*-aggregates 
(i, j, k) on U, and M is an EX*-aggregator; moreover, [0, A, U, EX*] and 
[A, U, EX*] are defined. 
In Theorems 4.10 to 4.13 we present some results concerning EX*- 
aggregation on R and on P. They correspond to the results given for 
EX-aggregation (see Section II). However, it is still an open problem 
whether information of the kind “hypothesis” is necessary to 
EX*-aggregate all teams (i, j, k) E N3 on P. 
THEOREM 4.10. N3~ [pure, R, EX*]. 
Proof A4 searches for two team members with limit hypotheses a and 
b, where q, and qb contradict each other only finitely often. Then one of 
them must EX*-identify the input function cp, and therefore also 
q c * (P~(~.~). Let co, err, CT~ EL. We define B(o,, CJ~, cz). In the definition, 
r((~,,, CJ~, a,) will coun; the number of contradictions between the 
hypotheses of the team members which can be detected in a certain number 
of steps. c1 and b mark those team members that are supposed to be the 
ones M searches for. 
Case 1. (Ii< 2) lh(o,) d 1. 
Then @(a,, (I, 02) := 0; 
a(a,, Ul, UJ := 0; P(q), Ul) az) := 1; 
$a,, Ul, 62) := 0. 
Case 2. Not case 1, and last(a,-)#last,(cr,-), or last(aa-)# 
last,(oa-), or r #z- with r number of contradictions between (P,~~~(~.-,,~ 
and 4~~~,~(,~- ),np where n = lb(a). 
Then a((~~, ol, CJ := (CI- + 1) mod 3; 
B(a,, ulr u2) := (fi- + 1) mod 3; 
a := last(a,); b := last(as); 
z(eO, r~r, c2) := number of contradictions between (P~,~ and (Pi,“; 
8(a,, ul, u2) := o(a, b). 
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Case 3. Neither case 1 nor case 2. 
Then a(cr,, oI, G?) := r-; 
P(QOY g,, az) :=p- : 
z(a,, 0,) a*) := z- ; 
~(cJ,, c,, az) := o(last(o,- ), last(og- )). 
Let @ E P, (i, j, k) E N ‘. 
If (i, j, k) EX*-identifies @, then M= 3~.8(M, [o], A4, [a], MJo.1) on @ 
converges as soon as c( and B mark two team members which have already 
converged to hypotheses a and b, where (pu and q>“b contradict each other 
only finitely often. Then u(a, b) is a correct hypothesis for cp. 1 
In the case of EX*-aggregation on P it seems to be necessary to use 
information of the kind “hypothesis,” as two functions can be contradictory 
in infinitely many points while each of them only finitely often contradicts 
a third function if this is only partially defined. 
THEOREM 4.11. N 3 E [hypothesis, P, EX*]. 
Proof The strategy 8 used in the proof of Theorem 1.1 is extended to 
a strategy 8, by modifying case 1 in order to capture finitely many 
anomalies: 
Case 1: if there are .x, y, z E N, y #z, (x, J,) E rng((s), and for some 
IE (6 .i wx> z> E (PM,(o).n\(PM,(rr).n- 12 then ol(~,,, gl, cl, a) := u(MJa), 
M,(o)) forp, qE {i,j,k}, p#qZ~#p. 
The argument is analogous to the one used in the proof of Theorem 1.1. 
Assume that (i, j, k) EX*-identifies $. If there are two converging team 
members with limit hypotheses a and 6, where cp E * qPh, then cp E * (P”(&). 
Obviously, v(a, b) can be found in finitely many steps by an inference 
machine using strategy 8,. 1 
As mentioned in Section II, Osherson et al. (1986) have shown that 
information of the kind “recent” is not sufficient to aggregate all teams on 
R. We will show that the same result holds for EX*-aggregation. The proof 
works along the lines of Osherson et al. (1986). 
THEOREM 4.12. lV3# [recent, R, EX*]. 
Prooj Let (Vx E N) q,(x) = 0, and define h E Iw such that 
Then qn E qa iff (Ph(,,) = cpa, and if qn G& qa then (P,,(n) # * cpO, i.e., (Ph(,,) and 
rp, differ in infinitely many places. 
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Furthermore, Va E C, let 
and 
~gw,b) := 
a if lh( 0) is even 
h(n) else. 
Suppose there existed a p.r.f. 8: N3 + N with N3 = [O, recent, R, EX*]. 
Given no N, 
Case l. (Pns(Po, so (Ph(n)=(Pa, and we show that @a, a, h(n)) = 
O(a, h(n), h(n)): Team (e, g(n),f(n)) identifies cp,. Now, assume that 
e(u, a, h(n)) # &a, h(n), h(n)). Then for M = %o.B(M,(a), MgCn,(o), 
Mfda)) it is 
if lb(o) is even, 
if lb(a) is odd. 
It follows that M does not converges for any 4 E P-in contradiction to the 
supposition that A4 EX*-aggregates (e, g(n), f(n)) on qa. 
Case 2. (P,, @ cp,, so (PhCn)# * cpu, and we show that O(a, a, h(n))# 
O(a, h(n), h(n)): If M aggregates all teams on [w, then obviously 
(Pa g * (PC?(o.u.h(n,) and (Ph(n) E * (P6’(a,h(n),hln)). 
But as qh(n) # * qa it is e(a, a, h(n)) # @a, h(n), h(n)). 
As for all II E PV &a, a, h(n)) 1 and e(a, h(n), h(n))l, we can decide 
whether q,, E cpu by comparison of 6(a, a, h(n)) and @a, h(n), h(n))-in 
contradiction to the Rice’s theorem. Therefore N3 $ [recent, Iw, EX*]. 1 
And again 
PROPOSITION 4.13. [recent, P, EX*] c [pure, P, EX*]. 
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2.5 works for EX*-identification. g 
DEFINITION 4.14. Let ME Z, Us P, and (i, j, k) E N3. M EX*- 
aggregates (i, j, k) on U directly iff M EX*-aggregates (i, j, k) on U, and 
tVqE O) tVnE N)E {“i(+Cnl)9 Mj(@Cnl)9 M/c(+‘Cnl)). 
For an inference machine M which Ex-identifies respectively EX*-iden- 
tilies a function cp E P and an enumeration @, the point of identification is 
the smallest n,,~ N with (Vn >n,) M(@[n])=M(@[n,]). Therefore, for 
EX-identification and EX*-identification such an n, is called point of 
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convergence, denoted by KP(M, @). Analogously to ZP(i, j, k, @), for a 
team (i, j, k) the point of convergence KP(i, j, k, @) is the smallest n, E N 
such that at least two of the team members have reached their point of 
convergence in step n,. 
DEFINITION 4.15. Let MEZ, UGP, and (i,j, k)EN3. 
M EX*-aggregates (i, j, k) efficiently on U iff M EX*-aggregates (i, j, k) 
on U and V@ E 0 with (i, j, k) EX*-identifies @ KP(M, $) < KP(i, j, k, @). 
PROPOSITION 4.16. N 3 $ [program, direct, IF!, EX*]. 
ProoJ The proof of the analogous result for EX-identification in 
(Osherson et al., 1986) works in our case. 1 
PROPOSITION 4.17. N3 $ [program, efficient, R, EX*]. 
Proof: Again the analogous result for EX-identification in (Osherson 
et al., 1986) can be used here, but with a slight modification. 
We use cp,, M,, h E R, f E Iw as in the proof of Theorem 4.12, only g E R 
differs: 
a, if a=(*), 
~g(n,(4 := 
h(n), if fl= (*, *), 
h(n), if there is some (x, y ) E rng(o), y # 0, 
b else. 
Let S := {(e, f(n), g(n)) I n E N }. Suppose there is a p.r.f. 9: IV’ x C --+ N 
with SG [e, program, efficient, R, EX*]; then again we would contradict 
Rice’s theorem. 
Let n E N. Then (e, f(n), g(n)) EX*-identifies (cp,, qhcnJ} E R. 
Case 1. (P,, G rp,, therefore cp, = qhcnI. Let 6, be an enumeration of (Pi 
with $,[l] = (*, *). It follows that KP(e, f(n), g(n), 4,) =O. According to 
the supposition 
@(e, f(n), g(n), (*I) = e(e, f(n), g(n), (*, *)I. 
Case 2. rp, g cp,, therefore q, # * (P,,(,,,. Let & be an enumeration 
of cpi with &[l] = (*, (0,O)). Again KP(e,f(n), g(n), 6;) =O, and 
CPA * ‘P~(~,~(~),~(~,,(*,,. Now let GLcn) be an enumeration of vhcn) T;li 
Ghcn)[2] = (*, *, (x, y)), where x, y E N and y # 0. 
We, f(n), dn)v 4h(nJ = 1, and (P+) c * c~e(,,f(~).~(~),(*.*)). But cp, # * (PW, 
and therefore 
@e, f(n), g(n), (*I) Z e(e, f(n), g(n), (*, *)I. 
Consequently we would have a decision procedure for “cp” c qp,?‘- 
a contradiction to the Rice’s theorem. 1 
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The following diagrams summarize the results concerning the three 
identification criteria considered in this paper-EX, EX*, and BC-as 
awe11 as general, direct, and efficient aggregation. 
(a) General aggregation: 
EX 
Recent not on [w 
Pure on IR, not on g0 
Hypothesis on P 
Program on P 
(b) Direct aggregation: 
EX 
Pure 
Program not on Iw 
EX* BC 
not on F! on P 
on [w on P 
on P on P 
on P on P 
EX* BC 
not on P 
not on R 
(c) Efficient aggregation: 
Recent 
Program 
EX EX* BC 
on P 
not on [w not on 58 
V. GENERALIZATION TO TEAMS WITH MORE THAN THREE MEMBERS 
As already mentioned in the introduction, all the theorems have been 
proved for teams with three elements for the sake of simplicity. But with 
one exception they also hold for teams with n members with n > 3, if we 
retain the definition that a team of inductive inference machines identifies 
a function iff the majority of the team members do so. In order to show 
how the proofs can be generalized to teams with n members we now 
present an example for the case “N” E . . . ” as well as an example for the 
case “Nfl# . ...” 
We need the following definitions: 
DEFINITION 5.1. Let n, k E N such that n + 1 < 2k < n + 2, 
10, ‘..> in- 1 EN, @E p, and CE {EX, EX*, BC}. 
(io, . . . . i, _ r) C-identifies @ iff 
(a) (VOdj<n- 1) (VME N) M&@[m])J., and 
(b) at least k of the inference machines M,, . . . . M,-, C-identify @5. 
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(1 O, . . . . i,- i) C-identities cp E P,” “(iO, . . . . i,_ ,) C-identifies U E P,” and 
“it4 C-aggregates (iO, . . . . i,, ,) on U” are defined correspondingly. 
DEFINITION 5.2. Let n E N, U E P, A E {recent, pure, hypothesis, 
program), 0: INF,d -+ N a p.r.f. and CE (EX, EX*, BC}. Then 
[Cl, A, U, Cl” := ((i,, . . . . i,-,)e N”/Ar.B(INF,(i,, . . . . irlpl, 0)) 
C-aggregates (i,, . . . . i, 1 ) on U}, 
[A, U, C]” := { TC N / 3 p.r.f. 19: INF, -+ N with TG [e, A, U, Cln>. 
Let n E N, and i,, . . . . i,- , E N. We define v,, E R” as follows: 
cp,C~) if cp,,(.u)l and (Vj,<n- 1 with ii < ik) 
‘P,,(if),....in-I)(X) := ‘pi,(x) 1 =a @l, (xl > @;&L 
undefined else. 
The example for the case “/O!’ E . . ” is the generalization of Theorem 2.2. 
THEOREM 5.3. For n > 3 N”E [hypothesis, PI”. 
Proof Let n>3, and kEN with n+1<2k<n+2. 
We use a slight modification of the strategy defined in the proof of 
Theorem 2.2. The modified strategy tries to find k team members which 
converge to indices not contradicting the input function. In each step, the 
k candidates are identified by k markers CI, , . . . . c(, . Function v helps to 
compute the aggregator’s hypotheses. 
Let (TV ,..., on-i, OEC, @EP. 
If 3i < n - 1 with lh( cri) 6 1 
then B(o,, . . . . on-i, 0) := last(o,), 
(Vl~iQk)cri(ao,...,a,~,):=i-1 
else m := lh(o,), 
(V 1 <i < k) a,: := cri(a;, . . . . a;- ,), 
(V 1 < i 6 k) aj := last(e,-), 
if 31 <i<k with last(a,-)#last,(o,-), or 
3 1 < i< k with (P=,,,, contradicts @[ml 
then (Vl <i<k) cli(crO, . . . . a,_,):=(cl,: + l)modn, 
(v 1 d i 6 k) ai := W~.~,o,...,,n~, J 
else (Vl gigk) a ((TV, . . . . cn-, 
. . . u)):=ai2 &go, ..., ,, , . k I > 3 k . CJ -1 U)~IV(U
Now let il, . . . . i,,c N, M := Aa.(M,,[a], . . . . Mi,[a], a], and $5~ P with 
(i i, . . . . i,) identifies @. 
There are at least k team members whose output sequences converge to 
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an index of a function being an extension of cp E P; i.e., there is a step s E N 
where k team members identifying the input function have reached their 
point of convergence. Obviously there is a step t>s where each of the 
markers ~1~) .. . . tq identifies such a team member and therefore does not 
change its position any more. As k > 2 at least one of the team members 
identified by the markers is an inference machine which identifies the input 
Q5. So the hypothesis given by inference machine A4 which is computed 
using function ok is an extension of cp, too. As M does not change this 
hypothesis any more it identifies the input function q. It follows that 
inference machine aggregates the team (i1, . . . . i,,). 1 
The example for the case “N” 4 . ..” is the generalization of Theorem 2.4. 
THEOREM 5.4. For n > 3 N” # [pure, P]. 
Proof: Let n>3, HEN with n-2<h<n-1, and 8: C”+N be the 
strategy of a given inference machine M. We assume that 8 is a total recur- 
sive function, for the same reason as given in the proof of Theorem 2.4. Let 
cp,, (~~6 P be defined as just there, i.e., 
q,(x) := 0 for all XE N, 
(Ph(X) :=i 
l if I = 0, 
0 else. 
Again, we use diagonalisation over the actions of 8 to define a team of n 
members. The team identifies either cp, or qb, whereas 8 cannot identify 
either ‘p, or 40~. The team consists of the inference machines defined in the 
proof of Theorem 2.4, namely Mi, Mj, Mk, where Mi converges to a, 
Mj converges to b, and Mk either diverges, or converges to u or to 6, 
depending on the behaviour of 8. The team contains h inference machines 
Mi, and h inference machines M,. If n is even it furthermore contains two 
inference machines M,. If n is odd there is only one inference machine M,. 
Now, if 8 working on the hypotheses computed by this team conveges to 
a, then Mk converges to b; therefore the majority of the team members 
identify 6, and vice versa. If 6’ diverges it does not identify any function, but 
the team still identifies the function which is undefined on argument 0 and 
is zero everywhere else (cf. Theorem 2.4). 1 
The exception to this is Theorem 3.20. This theorem cannot be 
generalized to teams with an arbitrary number of members but only to 
teams with more than four members. Namely, a team with four members 
using finite strategies can be aggregated by the following strategy 8 which 
even pure-preserves ZFZN: 8 waits till at least three members have reached 
their point of convergence. At least two of them-i.e., the majority-must 
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identify the input. Therefore the aggregator can make use of de R3 to 
compute a correct limit hypothesis. Obviously, there is no equivalent 
strategy for the aggregation of teams with more than four members, so 
Theorem 3.20 holds for all teams with n members where n > 4. 
CONCLUSION 
We have presented several results concerning the amount of information 
needed for aggregating a team of inductive inference machines under 
various conditions. These results are supplementary to the ones given by 
Osherson et al. (1986). 
There are still some open questions, e.g., whether N3 $ [pure, P, EX*], 
or whether there exists a p.r.f. 8 with N3 Ic0Ns E [0, recent, P’] and 8 recent- 
preserves ZCONS, and the same question for R, whether there exists 8 with 
N3 ,F,N E [0, program, R] and a 8 program-preserves IFIN, and whether 
f’V3 E [A, direct, P, BC] for A E {hypothesis, program}. 
Also further investigations with another kind of information delivery 
would be interesting, where Lo.B(Mi(o), M,(a), M,(a), a) defines 
the supervisory machine, especially how this compares with information of 
the kind “pure.” 
RECEIVED September 22, 1986; FINAL MANUSCRIPT RECEIVED April 9, 1990 
REFERENCES 
ANGLUIN, D., AND SMITH, C. H. (1982), “A Survey of Inductive Inference: Theory and 
Methods,” Technical Report 250, Dept. of Computer Science, Yale University. 
BLUM, M. (1967), A machine independent theory of the complexity of recursive functions, 
J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 14, 322. 
BLUM, L., AND BLUM, M. (1975). Toward a mathematical theory of inductive inference, 
Inform. Contr. 28, 125. 
BRANDT, U. (1982), “Eine Charakterisierung von identifizierbaren Mengen partiell rekursiver 
Funktionen,” Ph.D. thesis, Technical University Darmstadt. [In German] 
CASE, J., AND SMITH, C. H. (1978), Anomaly hierarchies of mechanical inductive inference, 
in “Proceedings, 10th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,” pp. 314-319, Assoc. 
Comput. Mach., New York. 
CASE, J., AND SMITH, C. H. (1983), Comparison of identification criteria for machine inductive 
inference, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 25, 193. 
FREIVALD, R. V., AND WIEHAGEN, R. (1979), Inductive inference with additional information, 
Elektr. Informationsverarb. Kybernetik 15, 179. 
GOLD, E. M. (1967), Language identification in the limit, Inform. Contr. 10, 447. 
MINICOZZI, E. (1976), Some natural properties of strong-identification in inductive inference, 
Theoret. Comput. Sci. 2, 345. 
OSHERSON, 0. N., STOB. M., AND WEINSTEIN, S. (1986), Aggregating inductive expertise, 
Inform. Contr. IO. 69. 
ON AGGREGATING INDUCTIVE EXPERTISE 167 
PITT, L., AND SMITH, C. H. (1988) Probability and plurality for aggregations of learning 
machines, Inform. and Comput. 11, 11. 
RICE, H. G. (1953), Classes of recursively enumerable sets and their decision problems, 
Trans. Amer. Math. Sot. 89, 25. 
ROGERS, H. JR. (1967), “Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability,” 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
SCHAFER-RICHTER, G. (1986), private communication. 
SMITH, C. H. (1982), The power of pluralism for automatic program synthesis, J. Assoc. 
Comput. Mach. 29, 1144. 
WIEHAGEN, R. (1976), Limes-Erkennung rekursiver Funktionen durch spezielle Strategien, 
Elektr. Informationsverarb. Kvbernetik 12, 93. [In German] 
